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ABSTRACT
Infrastructure development with public–private partnership (PPP) contracts has been claimed to
lead to better performance compared to regular contracts. However, the empirical evidence for
this claim is weak. The authors assessed the difference in the actual performance of Dutch
infrastructure PPP projects (design–build–finance–maintain: DBFM) compared to regularly
procured projects (design-and-construct: D&C). DBFM projects demonstrated significantly
better cost performance.
IMPACT
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) have been widely used for the development and
management of transport infrastructure, such as highways, railways, and waterways.
However, hard evidence that PPPs perform better than regularly procured projects is lacking.
Existing evidence tends to rely on anecdotal and perceptual data. This paper provides policy-
makers and managers with real information about the actual performance and benefits of PPPs.
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Introduction
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are popular,
particularly for the development and management of
transport infrastructure (for example Little, 2011). In
Europe, transport is the largest PPP sector in value
terms (European PPP Expertise Centre, 2018). Core
motivations to opt for PPPs have been off-balance
sheet financing of infrastructure projects, the transfer
of risks to the private sector, and increasing the
efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure
development and management (McQuaid & Scherrer,
2010; European PPP Expertise Centre, 2015). These
advantages are claimed to be the result of PPP
projects having strong inbuilt mechanisms that
reduce principal–agent problems.
However, recent events in the construction sector
have fuelled a debate about the future of PPPs,
especially that of the long-term infrastructure
contracts that are characterized by the transfer of
many risks to the private sector, including private
financing. For instance, following the bankruptcy of
the British construction company Carillion, said to be
caused by the complex and inflexible nature of the
contracts and the excessive risks for the companies,
and resulting in poor value for money, the UK
stopped signing new private finance initiative
contracts (Davies, 2018; GCR, 2018). In The
Netherlands, in the wake of financial problems at the
construction company Ballast Nedam, and because of
the perceived poor financial health of and
disappointing level of innovation from the
construction sector (for example Koenen, 2018), the
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management is
working on a new PPP approach (Rijkswaterstaat,
2019).
PPP scholars have observed that the evidence for
PPPs performing better than regularly procured
projects has been mixed (Hodge & Greve, 2017),
arguing that it is important that PPPs are studied and
assessed ‘away from the policy cheerleaders’ (Hodge
& Greve, 2007, p. 545). There are several reasons for
the weak evidence base:
. PPP research has been dominated by single case
studies (Tang et al., 2010; Bovaird, 2010).
. Quantitative research on the impact of contractual
forms (or organizational forms) on the
performance of PPPs has often been based on
surveys among project participants, generally
project managers (for example Clifton & Duffield,
2006; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Kort & Klijn, 2011;
Steijn et al., 2011; Warsen et al., 2018). Analyses are
often based on perceptual performance data and
have not included more objective measures of
performance, such as financial data or time delays.
. The outcomes of PPP projects are often evaluated ex
ante, using methods such as the public sector
comparator (for example Boardman & Hellowell,
2017). For instance, the Dutch Ministry of Finance
estimates that design–build–finance–maintain–
operate (DBFMO) projects (a type of PPP),
compared to traditionally procured projects as
defined by the public sector comparator, achieve
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prospected cost advantages—in terms of value for
money—ranging from 10 to 15% (Ministerie van
Financiën, 2016). A shortcoming of such studies is,
however, that they often tend to focus on forecast
outcomes, with the consequence that it remains
largely unclear whether the outcomes actually
materialize (Boers et al., 2013). For instance, low
bids on contracts may evaporate due to contract
changes during project construction (Mohamed
et al., 2011).
More research is needed, in our view, on the
difference in performance between PPP projects and
non-PPP projects. This paper addresses this research
gap.
We analysed the cost and time performance of 65
Dutch transportation infrastructure projects. Our data
concern actual performance in the implementation
phases of the projects (i.e. after the shovel has hit the
ground). Our analysis focuses on the comparison
between projects with a design–build–finance–
maintain (DBFM) contract and projects with a design-
and-construct (D&C) contract. Although both types
involve contract designs where the private partner is
integrally responsible for the design and construction
of the transport infrastructure, DBFM is generally
considered to be a PPP, whereas D&C is not
(Yescombe, 2007). The reason is that private project
financing, an essential element of PPPs, is present in
DBFM but not in D&C. Although a D&C contract can
be a subcontract in a DBFM project, they are
generally not considered PPPs on their own
(Yescombe, 2007).
In the next section, we develop a set of hypotheses,
rooted in principal–agent theory, arguing why DBFM
should perform better in terms of cost and time
performance than D&C. This theory provides a useful
lens for the present study, because DBFM projects
involve typical principal–agent relationships (Klijn,
2010). The reason is that both principal–agent
relationships and public–private relationships in
transport infrastructure projects are characterized by
a separation of ownership of the infrastructure and
the right to maintain and operate it; information
asymmetry between the public and private actors;
different interests; and uncertainty due to the long
life span of the relationship (Liu et al., 2016).
Hypotheses
Background: principal–agent problems
Amajor motivation to opt for a PPP in the development
and management of transport infrastructure is the
transfer of project risks to the private sector. The idea
is that, by involving the private sector, project risks
previously carried by the government are now
allocated to a private partner, under the assumption
that the private sector is better able to manage those
risks. The public and private sectors are governed by
different value systems—they have fundamentally
different perspectives, interests, goals, and practices
(Jacobs, 1992)—and these differences can lead to
positive synergies, resulting in increased project
quality and efficiency (Huxham & Vangen, 2000).
However, the increased involvement of the private
sector also adds risks associated with the contractual
arrangement between the public and private partners
(De Palma et al., 2009). The differences between the
public and private sectors can also lead to negative
outcomes when the partners choose to pursue their
self-interests at the expense of the shared project
interests (De Palma et al., 2009). Whereas the public
sector serves the public interest, a private partner
strives to maximize its profits (De Bettignies & Ross,
2010). This, then, concerns the principal–agent
problem in PPPs: where the involvement of the
private sector ‘offsets procurer cost burdens, it also
puts the private partner in significant control of the
whole project, inviting actions that siphon off
benefits to themselves at the cost of the procurer,
whose interests they are supposed to serve’ (Shrestha
& Martek, 2015).
The private partner (the agent) is able to serve their
self-interests at the expense of the public partner’s (the
principal) interests because their relationship is
characterized by an asymmetry of information, where
the agent is better informed than the principal (De
Palma et al., 2009; Shrestha & Martek, 2015). First, the
private partner has more information about their own
competences and skills. This may lead to the problem
of ‘adverse selection’ by the public partner (pre-
contract), where an agent that is not the best one for
the project is chosen (Shrestha & Martek, 2015).
Second, the private partner has more information
about the project’s internal and external risks (De
Palma et al., 2009). This may lead the agent to act
opportunistically by deliberately misrepresenting the
risks and the measures required to mitigate them (Liu
et al., 2016; Fernandez et al., 2018). This is referred to
as a ‘moral hazard’ (Shrestha & Martek, 2015). An
example is contractors falsely claiming additional
costs after a project has started (Mohamed et al., 2011).
Principal–agent theories explore the governance
mechanisms that aim to regulate the self-serving
behaviour of the agent (Bovaird, 2010). For PPPs,
these mechanisms focus on contract specifications,
monitoring the agent’s performance, and the
performance-dependent payment (De Palma et al.,
2009; Leruth, 2012; Reynaers, 2015). First, transaction
costs theory states that contracts should be as
complete, stable, and fully specified as possible, but
that there are limits to this and too much contract
complexity may decrease the performance of PPPs
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(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Williamson, 2002). Contract
stability and specificity decrease uncertainty and
project information asymmetry between the partners,
thus curtailing the problem of moral hazard. At the
same time, a certain extent of ‘incompleteness’ is
unavoidable as actors cannot anticipate everything
that will happen (Williamson, 2002). Incompleteness
may also be needed, under the assumption that this
allows the private partner to fully use their
competences and skills to innovate and to plan and
design a project (Reynaers, 2015). If the contract is
fully specified, these competences and skills are
underused. Moreover, a certain degree of contract
flexibility may also allow incorporating possible
contract changes (Demirel et al., 2017). This can
reduce the possibility of moral hazards, resulting in
less claims that would otherwise have led to
additional costs (Fernandez et al., 2018). Second,
however, according to principal–agent theory,
contract incompleteness requires monitoring of the
agent’s behaviour, increasing the public partner’s
information about the agent’s competences, skills,
and performance. This can curtail the problem of
adverse selection. To this end, it is important that the
output indicators in the contract are measurable and
that the public partner has access to performance
data (De Palma et al., 2009). Because extensive
contract monitoring generally leads to increased
transaction costs (Carbonara et al., 2016), in
PPP projects the principal often ‘monitors from a
distance’ using, for example, system-oriented contract
management (Rijkswaterstaat, 2014). Third,
performance-dependent payment means that the
private partner is financially fined (or rewarded) by
the principal based on their performance, which
incentivizes them to perform well: ‘credible
punishment’ (De Palma et al., 2009). These
mechanisms may be found in both DBFM and D&C
contracts: our next two subsections therefore focus
on specific differences between the two contract types.
DBFM versus D&C: cost performance
In D&C contracts, the risks associated with designing
and building (construction) infrastructures are
transferred to the private sector; in DBFM,
additionally, the maintenance risks are also
transferred (Culp, 2011). It has been argued that
transferring as much risk as possible leads to
efficiency gains—the bundling of design and build
with maintenance leads to better designs that will
minimize maintenance costs (Martimort & Pouyet,
2008; Moore et al., 2017). Because improved designs
may require learning new procedures for project
construction and maintenance that may actually
increase costs (Martimort & Pouyet, 2008), we expect
to find DBFM contracts mainly in larger projects.
In both D&C and DBFM, the ownership of the
infrastructure in the end remains with the public
partner who pays for the project design, construction
and, in the case of DBFM, maintenance as well.
However, in DBFM, the project activities are (at least
in part) privately financed (Culp, 2011). A special
purpose vehicle (SPV) is set up in which the
contractors are the shareholders, sometimes
supplemented with infrastructure investors (Grimsey
& Lewis, 2004). The SPV uses contracts secondary to
the concession contract (i.e. the public–private
contract), to finance the project through (short- and
long-term) loans with financiers such as banks and
with subcontracts for the design, build, and
maintenance of the project (Ng & Loosemore, 2007;
Demirag et al., 2011).
Because governments have clear financing cost
advantages over private consortia (governments can
normally borrow money at lower interest rates)
(Leruth, 2012; Moore et al., 2017), we expected to
find DBFM contracts mainly in larger projects. DBFM
requires a certain project size to be a viable option. In
The Netherlands, DBFM is thus normally only
considered for projects worth over 60 million euro
(Ministerie van Financiën, 2013). There are several
reasons why the private financing in DBFM is
expected to lead to better cost performance.
First, in DBFM, risks related to design, construction,
and maintenance are allocated to the private partner
(De Palma et al., 2009). Therefore, unplanned
additional work may have to be financed by the
private partner. The private financing of the
additional work increases uncertainty—‘will the
financiers provide the loan?’—and transaction costs
for the private partner. The private partner will
therefore try to minimize any additional work that
would lead to increased costs. The business model in
DBFM focuses on finding innovative and efficient
solutions through integrated project designs and
processes and life-cycle optimization (Lenferink et al.,
2013). In D&C contracts, in contrast, additional work is
not privately financed. This means that the
uncertainty and transaction costs associated with
privately financing additional work are absent.
Instead, claiming additional work at the expense of
the public partner may increase the private partner’s
revenue and potentially their profit.
Second, the equity provider in DBFM, who finances
the activities of the private consortium, is expected to
provide ‘an added level of diligence for effective
project execution’ (Culp, 2011, p. 237). Financiers are
risk-averse and they will place high demands on
sound, high-quality risk management for them to
provide the loans and invest in the project (Demirag
et al., 2011). The idea is that this leads to a better
identification, allocation, and mitigation of risks.
Practitioners sometimes refer to this effect of private
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financing on risk management as ‘the shadow of the
banks’. The assumed improved risk management
decreases uncertainty and risks, leading to less
additional work hence costs. It also means that the
private partner is forced to explicate their risk
management plan during the tendering phase of the
project, explicating its risk management competences
and skills, thereby decreasing the problem of adverse
selection. The possibility of the effect of the shadow
of the banks is absent in projects with a D&C
contract. Because of these two reasons elaborated
here, our first hypothesis is:
H1: DBFM projects have better cost performance (i.e. less
additional work costs) than D&C projects.
DBFM versus D&C: time performance
Performance-dependent payment is an essential
element of PPP projects. In many DBFM projects, the
private partner finances the project and receives
payments from the public partner only when the
project is fully constructed (Culp, 2011). However,
there can be additional project milestones when the
private partner receives a payment. When the
construction phase is finished and the transport
infrastructure is in full use, the SPV can continue to
receive a stream of payments from the public partner
for infrastructure maintenance for a period of around
20–30 years (Yescombe, 2007). Importantly, the
private partner’s revenue structure is highly
dependent on the payment stream from the public
partner (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). When the private
partner fails to comply with the output specifications
agreed in the contract, they can be fined and their
payments reduced (Demirag et al., 2011). Moreover,
when the private partner fails to meet important
milestones (deadlines) agreed with the public partner,
they can be fined or their payments delayed. Because
the project financing consists of multiple short- and
long-term loans, the private partner might not be
able to meet their debt service obligations. This will
have a negative effect on the private partner’s credit
rating and their profits may decrease (Ng &
Loosemore, 2007).
The bundling of the design, build, and operating
stages of projects, as well as the transfer of risks, can
thus enhance the speed of the project: ‘the transfer
of construction and operating risks to private
contractors incentivizes speedy completion of
projects as revenues for the private sector depend on
satisfactory completion and ongoing availability of
the asset’ (O’Shea et al., 2019, p. 250). Although the
literature shows that performance-dependent
payment is not always consistently applied in Dutch
DBFM projects (see Reynaers, 2015), the D&C
contracts business model relies to a much lesser
extent on meeting deadlines. The evidence may be
somewhat mixed, but ‘the main theoretical and
empirical literature supports the proposition that PPP
results in faster delivery of projects’ (O’Shea et al.,
2019, p. 250). Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
H2: DBFM projects have better time performance (i.e.
less delay in finishing project construction) than D&C
projects.
Data and method
Data collection
The data were collected between April and July 2018
from the project database of Rijkswaterstaat.
Rijkswaterstaat is an executive agency of the Dutch
Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and
it is the major procurer of highway and waterway
transport infrastructure in The Netherlands. Access to
the data was allowed so long as it was anonymized
and that the research results would not be traceable
to specific projects or persons. After the analyses
were performed, practitioner views on the results
were collected during a meeting at the Procurement
Centre for Civil Engineering in Rijkswaterstaat,
discussing the findings and the implications for
public procurers.
The database contained a total of 298 highway
projects. After deleting cases that were not
infrastructure projects, i.e. projects that did not
include infrastructure construction and instead
concerned programmes, small measures such as road
signage placements or sound barriers, and innovation
projects, among other things (173 projects), and that
were devoid of data (59 projects), a total of 66
highway projects remained (i.e. construction of roads,
tunnel, and bridges). Finally, one project was
excluded because it was a ‘calamity’ project that had
not gone through a normal procurement and
decision-making process. A total of 65 projects was
selected.
Some of the projects were missing some data,
leading to a different N for different analyses in this
paper. Nine projects had a DBFM contract (14%) and
56 projects had a D&C contract (86%). The oldest
project by implementation start commenced in
February 2008 and the most recent project by
implementation start commenced in April 2017.
Because DBFM only started to really take off in The
Netherlands after 2007 (Eversdijk & Korsten, 2015),
because D&C is the standard form of contracting by
Rijkswaterstaat (Lenferink et al., 2013), and because
DBFM is only considered for large or very large
projects, this explains the larger share of D&C
contracts in the dataset and the relatively small
number of DBFM contracts.
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Data measurement and analysis
The analyses focused on four variables: cost
performance in euro, time performance, contract
type, and project size. Cost performance was
measured as: the value in euro of the sum of the
additional work costs after the end of the D&C/DBFM
contract(s), divided by the value of the contract(s),
resulting in a percentage. Some projects involved
multiple contracts (hence the plural). As an example,
one project with a contract value of approximately
1.4 billion euro and additional work with costs of
approximately 170 million euro had a cost
performance of 12.14%. Higher percentages indicate
higher additional work costs and thus a lower cost
performance.
Time performance was measured as the number of
days between the start of the implementation phase
and the full recommissioning of the infrastructure
after completion of the construction works (i.e. the
infrastructure is back in full use). For D&C contracts,
the start of the implementation phase was marked by
the milestone ‘shovel in the ground’ in the project
database. For DBFM contracts, it was marked by the
‘date of commencement’, i.e. when the private
partner received their starting certification. By
subtracting the actual length from the planned
length of the implementation phase, we found the
implementation delay in terms of days. As an
example, one project’s implementation started on 25
April 2011 and the infrastructure was fully
recommissioned on 29 April 2016. The actual length
of the implementation phase was therefore 1804
days. Because the recommissioning was planned on 1
December 2015 (i.e. a planned implementation phase
of 1656 days), the delay was 148 days. Dividing this
delay by the planned implementation duration (i.e.
148/1656), gives a time performance of 8.94%. Higher
percentages express higher time overruns and thus a
lower performance.
We calculated the relative time performance for
different moments in time. First, we calculated the
time performance for the recommissioning date as
planned when the contract was awarded. We called
this the ‘relative time performance T = 0’. Over the
duration of implementation, however, scope changes
can lead to an adjustment of the planned
recommissioning date (Verweij et al., 2015). Second,
we calculated the time performance for the
recommissioning date in March 2018: ‘relative time
performance 2018-T1’.
Contract type was a nominal variable: D&C or DBFM.
DBFM contracts are mainly found in larger projects;
therefore we also included project size as a variable.
Project size was measured as the value of the
contract(s) of the project at the moment of contract
closure, i.e. the initial contract value of the project.
We performed analyses for three different sets. In the
first ‘all-inclusive set’, project size was not accounted
for and the full group of 56 D&C projects was
compared to the full group of nine DBFM projects. In
the second ‘Rijkswaterstaat policy set’, only projects
above 60 million euro were compared. The logic
behind this set was that DBFM is normally only
considered for projects over 60 million euro
(Ministerie van Financiën, 2013). Therefore, it made
sense to compare D&C projects above 60 million euro
with DBFM projects (which are always above 60
million euro). The third ‘empirically-informed set’
started with the clusters as defined by Cantarelli et al.
(2012; see also Verweij et al., 2015) in their analysis of
cost overruns in Dutch transport infrastructure
projects: small projects under 50 million euro,
medium projects (50–112.5 million euro), large
projects (112.5–225 million euro), and very large
projects (above 225 million euro). Then, since we
empirically observed DBFM projects only within the
large and very large groups (i.e. above 112.5 million
euro), we decided to run the analysis for this set only
for projects above 112.5 million euro, in order to
compare projects which are, based on their actual
size, more equal.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations for
project size, cost performance (in absolute and relative
values), time performance (in absolute days and
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all DBFM and D&C projects (N
ranging from 37 to 65 depending on data availability).
Contract type DBFM D&C Total
Project size (k€) N = 9 N = 49 N = 58
Mean 631,427.67 75,900.45 162,102.95
SD 576,336.89 92,262.55 308,147.03
Absolute cost performance (k€) N = 9 N = 49 N = 58
Mean 60,480.33 17,100.41 23,831.78
SD 87,646.23 24,199.96 42,688.97
Relative cost performance (%) N = 9 N = 49 N = 58
Mean 6.24 24.72 21.85
SD 5.80 24.32 23.42
Absolute time performance
T = 0 (days)
N = 6 N = 31 N = 37
Mean -164.67 12.35 -16.35
SD 547.95 320.93 363.19
Absolute time performance
2018-T1 (days)
N = 7 N = 33 N = 40
Mean -151.71 -59.55 -75.68
SD 99.59 225.12 210.64
Relative time performance T = 0
(%)
N = 6 N = 31 N = 37
Mean -11.79 1.20 -.09
SD 30.77 57.34 53.8
Relative time performance
2018-T1 (%)
N = 7 N = 34 N = 41
Mean -16.67 -6.02 -7.83
SD 11.31 52.63 48.17
Project completeness (%) N = 9 N = 56 N = 65
Mean 86.74 96.62 95.25
SD 27.24 14.59 16.95
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relative delays), and project completeness for the ‘all-
inclusive set’. DBFM projects performed better in
terms of both cost and time performance. The
average relative cost performance was 6.24% in
DBFM projects and 24.72% in D&C projects. This
means that DBFM projects have, on average,
additional work costs of 6.24% of the initial contract
value, whereas the average relative increase in costs
due to additional work in D&C projects was almost
four times higher. Regarding the time performance
for the recommissioning date as planned at the time
of the contract award (T = 0), we observed that DBFM
projects had, on average, a delay of -11.79% of the
planned duration of the implementation phase, i.e. an
acceleration of the implementation phase. The
average time performance was even better, at
16.67%, when changed planned dates for the
recommissioning of the infrastructure, due to scope
changes, were taken into account (2018-T1). Table 1
shows that the time performance for D&C projects
was lower.
Finally, project completeness expresses the
percentage of completion of the implementation
phase at the moment of data collection. There were
five projects which had not fully finished the
construction phase: two DBFM projects and three
D&C projects. Since the differences, regarding the
relative cost performance, between the projects with
100% completeness and the projects with a lower
completeness were not significant, we decided to
include them in the analysis. Concerning time
performance, these projects are of course missing
cases.
The descriptive statistics show that the standard
deviations in both sets (DBFM and D&C) were
generally high. Hence, there was some variation
within both sets. This holds especially for the set with
D&C projects regarding the relative cost performance
(compared to the DBFM projects).
Cost performance
For a more nuanced comparison between the DBFM
projects and the D&C projects, we constructed the
three different sets—see Table 2. The data were not
normally distributed: in the ‘all-inclusive set’, the
Shapiro-Wilk test was not significant for the DBFM
group (0.14), but it was for the D&C group (0.00). We
therefore used the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U
test. This test has the advantage that it neither assumes
equal variance within groups nor equal sample sizes.
The difference between the DBFM projects and the
D&C projects for relative cost performance for all three
sets was statistically significant. In fact, the mean scores
across the three analyses with different project sizes for
the D&C contracts did not differ much. We performed a
Pearson correlation analysis to check whether project
size and project completeness had a relationship with
cost performance, which was not the case (non-
significant values of -0.16 and 0.16, respectively).
Hence, although both DBFM projects and D&C
projects had additional work costs, DBFM projects
performed better than D&C projects. We therefore
confirmed our first hypothesis (H1).
Time performance
Table 3 shows the results for the differences in time
performance (both for T = 0 and 2018-T1). Again, we
Table 2. Comparative group analyses (Mann-Whitney U test)
for relative cost performance (%).
Contract type DBFM D&C
Mann-
Whitney U
Significance
difference
(two-tailed)?
(p value*)
Set 1: All-inclusive set N = 9 N = 49 95.00 Yes (0.007)
Mean 6.24 24.72
SD 5.80 24.32
Mean Rank 15.56 32.06
Set 2: Rijkswaterstaat
policy set
N = 9 N = 18 28.00 Yes (0.005)
Mean 6.24 27.19
SD 5.80 23.73
Mean Rank 8.11 16.94
Set 3: Empirically-
informed set
N = 9 N = 11 15.00 Yes (0.007)
Mean 6.24 24.27
SD 5.80 20.59
Mean Rank 6.67 13.64
*Sig two-tailed: p≤ 0.05.
Table 3. Comparative group analyses (Mann-Whitney U test)
for relative time performance (%).
Contract type DBFM D&C
Mann-
Whitney U
Significance
difference
(two-tailed)?
(p value*)
Set 1: All-inclusive set Time
overrun (%) [T = 0]
N = 6 N = 31 67.00 No (.302)
Mean -11.79 1.20
SD 30.77 57.34
Mean rank 14.67 19.84
Set 1: All-inclusive set Time
overrun (%) [2018-T1]
N = 7 N = 34 80.50 No (0.186)
Mean -16.67 -6.02
SD 11.31 52.63
Mean rank 15.50 22.13
Set 2: Rijkswaterstaat
policy set [T = 0]
N = 6 N = 12 19.00 No (0.125)
Mean -11.79 10.36
SD 30.77 31.36
Mean rank 6.67 10.92
Set 2: Rijkswaterstaat
policy set [2018-T1]
N = 7 N = 12 20.00 No (0.068)
Mean -16.67 0.74
SD 11.31 22.46
Mean Rank 6.86 11.83
Set 3: Empirically-informed
set [T = 0]
N = 6 N = 7 11.00 No (0.181)
Mean -11.79 13.57
SD 30.77 34.32
Mean rank 5.33 8.43
Set 3: Empirically-informed
set [2018-T1]
N = 7 N = 7 10.00 No (0.073)
Mean -16.67 6.26
SD 11.31 26.13
Mean rank 5.43 9.57
* Sig two-tailed: p≤ 0.05.
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opted for the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test
because the data on this variable were not normally
distributed. This holds in particular for the D&C
group, for which the Shapiro-Wilk test was significant
for both T = 0 and 2018-T1 (0.00/0.00), while it was
not significant for the DBFM group in the all-inclusive
set (.24/.51).
The differences between the DBFM projects and the
D&C projects for relative time performance (for both T
= 0 and 2018-T1) for all three sets were not statistically
significant. Although the DBFM projects had, on
average, better time performance, the difference in
ranked distributions with the D&C projects was not
statistically significant based on the Mann-Whitney U
test. We have to note here that we are dealing with a
relatively small sample and relatively large standard
deviations, partly explaining why the difference in
time performance between the two groups was not
found significant, although the mean scores of the
two groups varied considerably. We therefore could
not confirm our second hypothesis (H2). The
differences between DBFM and D&C in the
‘Rijkswaterstaat policy set’ and the ‘empirically-
informed set’ did, however, approximated
significance, particularly for the 2018-T1 values.
Furthermore, we performed a Pearson correlation
analysis to check whether project size showed a
relationship with time performance, which was not
the case (non-significant values of 0.01 and 0.02 for T
= 0 and 2018-T1, respectively).
Conclusions and discussion
Cost and time performance
At the beginning of this paper, we asked whether the
widely-claimed advantages of developing and
managing transport infrastructure through PPPs
actually materialize. We therefore looked for empirical
evidence about the advantages of DBFM over D&C, in
terms of cost and time performance. With respect to
time performance, we cannot conclude that DBFM
contracts perform significantly better than projects
with a D&C contract, although there were indications
of differences in our data in favour of DBFM projects.
Based on our analyses, we conclude that DBFM
projects performed significantly better than D&C
projects with respect to costs (cf. Verweij et al., 2015).
It could be argued that this effect of contract type on
cost performance is explained by the fact that the
D&C contracts we studied had a much smaller project
size (see Table 1). However, when we compared only
the large projects, the results produced the same
picture—DBFM projects performed better.
Furthermore, no relationship was found between
project size and cost performance. This is an
important finding. Whereas recent studies have
suggested that contract characteristics explain PPP
performance to only a limited extent (for example
Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) or not at all (for example
Kort & Klijn, 2011), our findings show that contract
type does matter for cost performance.
Contribution of the study
Some studies have shown that relational aspects and
process management seem to be more important for
PPP performance (Kort & Klijn, 2011). However, those
studies did not systematically compare different
contract types (but instead focused on contract
characteristics). Moreover, they were based on
perceptual data and did not include hard
performance data (such as costs and time as in the
present paper). Much of the existing public
administration literature on the relationship between
the contract characteristics of PPPs and performance
is based on interviews or survey data, involving the
measuring of managers’ perceptions about the
contracts and their impact on performance. Hard
project data can add to this. However, hard project
data (on costs and time performance) are often hard
to come by, because the data are not publicly
available and because of confidentiality issues. We
were able to collect and analyse real project data; so
this paper is an important contribution to the
academic literature on PPP performance. Clearly,
more studies that analyse actual PPP performance
data are needed. A promising avenue for future
research would be to combine different types of data,
using a mixed method design including both
quantitative hard performance data and qualitative
experience-based judgments of project participants.
Discussion and further research
Several important comments have to be made in
relation to our findings. First, the average relative cost
performance of the DBFM projects in our dataset was
6.24%. This means that additional work that occurred
after the contract was concluded led to increased
project costs for the public partner of 6.24% of the
initial contact value. Although the cost advantages of
DBFM over D&C certainly speak in favour of
developing and managing transport infrastructure
through PPPs, the cost increase in DBFM may be a
reason for continued concern. It is therefore
imperative that the search for improved design and
management of DBFM contracts continues.
Second, fully specified and complete contracts may
cancel out the opportunistic behaviour of the private
partner (Hart, 2003). However, contracts are
incomplete by definition (Badenfelt, 2011); after the
contract is fixed, events can occur that could not
have been predicted and, naturally, private partners
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may respond to events in a way that protects or serves
their interests. Increasing the private partner’s
proportion of the benefits generated in the PPP can
decrease their incentive to act opportunistically (Liu
et al., 2016). In Dutch DBFM projects, however, this
may be difficult to achieve because the revenue is
rooted in availability-based payments instead of
usage-based payments (for example toll fees)
(Yescombe, 2007).
Third, our analysis did not include the reasons
behind the costs associated with the additional work.
For instance, in the current debate on the future of
PPPs, the effects and therefore the desirability of
private financing as part of a PPP contract has been
called into question, because it can lead to unfair
contracts (in Dutch: wurgcontracten) that place too
much risk on the construction companies instead of
leading to improved risk management (Koenen,
2019a; 2019b). However, we could not assess the
actual effect of private financing on the quality of risk
management (Culp, 2011) as an explanation for cost
performance. Also, we did not analyse different cost
categories. A previous study indicated, for instance,
that scope changes are the most common reason for
additional work in the implementation phase and
that smaller projects are particularly subject to
additional costs due to contract omissions (Verweij
et al., 2015). That study, though, did not distinguish
between DBFM and D&C contracts. The question
therefore remains what exactly explains the
occurrence of additional work in DBFM projects.
Our study has some limitations. Although our
empirical basis was not particularly small in
comparison with other studies that compared the
performance of PPP projects with that of non-PPP
projects (for example Atmo et al., 2017; O’Shea et al.,
2019; Chasey et al., 2012), our dataset included only
nine DBFM projects. Second, although the project
completeness was high, and although projects with
full completeness were not significantly different
from the projects that were incomplete, future
analyses should be performed on the data when all
the projects have concluded their implementation
phases to further strengthen the results.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the cost and time
performance of projects. Do PPPs achieve better
results when it comes to additional work costs and
time overruns than regularly procured projects? We
found that DBFM projects had better cost
performance than D&C projects. DBFM projects also
seemed to perform better regarding time overruns,
although the difference was not statistically
significant. Our findings are in line with some recent
studies into the cost and time performance of PPP
projects versus that of traditionally or regularly
procured projects. Atmo et al. (2017) statistically
analysed 56 power plants in Indonesia and found
that the DBFM(O) projects had better time
performance. O’Shea et al. (2019), studying the
procurement of schools in Ireland, found that,
although tendering took longer in the DBFM cases,
the construction time for DBFM schools was shorter
than for schools under traditional procurement.
Finally, Chasey et al. (2012) compared DBFM(O)
contracts with design–build procurement (i.e. D&C) in
road projects in North America and found that the
PPP projects had both better time performance and
better cost performance. These studies, together with
this one, speak in favour of DBFM procurement. It is
too early, however, to conclude that DBFM by
definition performs better; the literature continues to
show mixed results regarding PPP performance.
Moreover, focusing on costs and time might be
considered rather narrow. Current policy debates
stress the value of PPPs in achieving, for example,
innovative and sustainable transport solutions by
capitalizing on the innovative capacities of the
private sector. Are some time delays and additional
project costs acceptable if the result is increased
project quality, sustainability, innovation, or other
perhaps unforeseen social benefits? We should not
blindly focus on cost and time performance—PPPs
may prove to be valuable vehicles for other reasons
too.
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